EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and the Bab el-Mandeb Threat: What the EU Can and Cannot Do

The conversation about chokepoints has so far focused almost entirely on the Strait of Hormuz. That is understandable — Hormuz is where the immediate crisis is, and the IEA has described the current situation as surpassing every energy shock since 1973 combined. But a second chokepoint has quietly moved to the centre of the threat picture this week, and it deserves direct analysis.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait — a 29-kilometre-wide passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and ultimately the Suez Canal — carries roughly 12% of global oil shipments and around 10% of all global trade. The Houthis, who control the Yemeni side of the strait, have this week publicly described closing it as among their options. Iran's parliament speaker has posted publicly asking what share of global oil, LNG, wheat, rice, and fertiliser moves through it. That is the language of coercive signalling, not idle commentary.

The EU already has a naval operation running in exactly this geography. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES has been escorting merchant vessels through the Red Sea since the Houthis began attacking commercial shipping in October 2023. The EU Council extended its mandate through February 2027 as recently as February 2026. So the question is straightforward: can ASPIDES handle what is being threatened?

What ASPIDES Was Built to Do

ASPIDES is a defensive maritime security operation. That description is not a qualifier — it is the operation's legal and operational foundation. Its mandate, as established by the EU Council and reaffirmed in the February 2026 extension, is to protect merchant vessels from attack: intercepting incoming missiles and drones, escorting commercial ships through threatened waters, and sharing maritime intelligence with partners. The operation is commanded by Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis of Greece and operates with frigates and destroyers contributed by EU member states on rotation.

The March 2026 mandate update expanded ASPIDES's role in two directions. First, it added intelligence collection and sharing on suspicious activities near critical submarine infrastructure — undersea cables and pipelines — reflecting European concern about hybrid attacks on physical connectivity. Second, it tasked ASPIDES with training Djiboutian maritime forces and cooperating with the Yemeni Coast Guard, a capacity-building role designed to build regional partners' ability to manage their own waters over time.

These are meaningful additions. They are also entirely consistent with the operation's defensive character. Nothing in the mandate authorises ASPIDES to strike targets on Yemeni territory, suppress launch infrastructure, or conduct offensive operations against Houthi forces.

Why the Bab el-Mandeb Scenario Is Categorically Different

The Houthi threat to Bab el-Mandeb is not, at its core, a threat to ships at sea. It is a threat to close a strait by controlling one of its banks. The Yemeni coastline on the eastern side of the passage is Houthi-held territory. A closure in practice means land-based anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and swarm drone attacks originating from that coastline, targeted at any vessel attempting to transit — coordinated in a way that makes the passage commercially and practically impassable.

Defeating that threat requires one of three things. The first is suppressing Houthi launch capability onshore through sustained air strikes or ground operations inside Yemen. ASPIDES has neither the offensive mandate nor the land-attack capability to do this. The second is deploying a deterrent force concentration powerful enough — carrier strike groups, sustained combat air patrol, the full architecture of power projection — to make the Houthis and their Iranian patrons calculate that the cost of closure exceeds the benefit. ASPIDES operates at a fraction of that scale. The third is diplomatic pressure on Iran sufficient to restrain the Houthis before they act. The EU has been pursuing this lane actively, but it has not, to date, produced a change in Houthi behaviour.

ASPIDES was designed for a world where the threat is harassment of individual vessels by missiles and drones at sea. It was not designed for a world where a state-aligned force with Iranian backing closes an entire strait by controlling the land on one side of it.

What the EU's Own Actions Signal

The official EU actions tell its own story about where European leaders assess ASPIDES's limits. On March 9, 2026, both European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — speaking after a video conference with leaders from Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and ten other regional states — publicly stated they were open to enhancing EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and ATALANTA in response to the evolving situation. That phrasing matters. Leaders of institutions do not describe existing operations as needing enhancement unless they believe those operations are insufficient for the threat at hand.

On March 2, 2026, the EU Commission's Security College convened specifically to review Middle East spillovers for the European Union, announcing reinforced monitoring of transport disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and convening an Energy Task Force with member states and the International Energy Agency. The EU's March 19 European Council conclusions called explicitly for safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Notably, the conclusions do not name Bab el-Mandeb — an omission that reflects where the EU's strategic focus has been concentrated, and which may need to be corrected given this week's developments.

The EU has also been applying financial and sanctions pressure on Houthi revenue networks. In January 2026, the EU Council expanded restrictive measures covering Iran's support to armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea region. The US Treasury and State Department have run ten separate rounds of sanctions targeting Houthi financing networks, oil transfers, and weapons procurement. These measures have not stopped Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. There is limited reason to expect they would stop a strait closure decision driven by Iranian strategic direction.

The Honest Assessment

If the Houthis move to close Bab el-Mandeb, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES can do the following: attempt to escort vessels through the transit corridor, intercept projectiles targeting those vessels, and provide maritime intelligence to the broader coalition operating in the region. What it cannot do is reopen the strait. That task — if it gets done at all — requires the offensive capacity, the force scale, and the political will to conduct sustained operations against Houthi military infrastructure inside Yemen. Only the United States Navy currently has all three.

What ASPIDES does provide in this scenario is European presence and legitimacy. It ensures that EU-flagged vessels have a dedicated escort rather than relying entirely on US protection. It gives Europe a seat at the table in any post-crisis maritime security architecture. And it signals to regional partners — Egypt, Djibouti, the Gulf states — that the EU is a committed maritime actor, not merely a sanctions-writer from a safe distance. The €1 billion disbursed to Egypt under the EU-Egypt Strategic Comprehensive Partnership in January 2026, explicitly in response to the economic pressure caused by Houthi Red Sea attacks, is part of the same strategic picture: the EU using the instruments it has.

But European citizens and businesses exposed to an oil price shock — and the IEA has warned that the current crisis already surpasses 1973, 1979, and 2002 combined — should understand clearly what ASPIDES is and is not. It is a credible defensive naval operation that has been doing real work protecting European commercial shipping since 2024. It is not a force capable of preventing a determined, Iranian-backed closure of one of the world's most critical maritime passages. Closing that gap, if it needs to be closed, will require either a political settlement with Iran or a military escalation that goes far beyond the EU's current mandate and posture.

What to Watch

Houthi operational signals at the strait itself: Watch for reports of Houthi naval mining activity, anti-ship missile repositioning toward the Yemeni coast near Bab el-Mandeb, or drone swarm deployments in the southern Red Sea. These would indicate a move from rhetoric to preparation.

EU Council emergency convening on ASPIDES mandate: Any extraordinary EU Council meeting specifically addressing ASPIDES rules of engagement or mandate expansion would signal that member states are preparing for a more active role — and would require unanimous agreement among 27 governments.

Saudi Arabia's Yanbu pipeline throughput: The East-West Pipeline running to Yanbu is currently at near-capacity, handling close to 5 million barrels per day of rerouted Saudi exports. Any disruption to that pipeline — which sits within Houthi missile range — combined with a Bab el-Mandeb closure would represent the simultaneous blockage scenario that would drive oil toward $200 a barrel.

US naval force concentration in the region: Additional US carrier strike group deployments to the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden would be the clearest signal that Washington is preparing an offensive deterrence posture — the only realistic short-term answer to a full strait closure.

Iran-US diplomatic channel activity: Secretary Rubio confirmed in late March 2026 that the US prefers diplomacy with Iran and that private talks are ongoing. Any public signal of progress — or breakdown — in those talks will directly affect the probability of Houthi action at Bab el-Mandeb, since the Houthis do not act without Iranian direction.

Methodology & Sources

This analysis is generated from structured event data extracted from official government and institutional sources worldwide.

This report does not constitute predictions or financial or legal advice.